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On the Dynamics of Distributed Energy Adoption:
Equilibrium, Stability, and Limiting Capacity
Tao Sun, Lang Tong, and Donghan Feng
Abstract—The death spiral hypothesis in electric utility repre-
sents a positive feedback phenomenon in which a regulated utility
is driven to financial instability by rising prices and declining
demand. We establish conditions for the existence of death spiral
and conditions of stable adoption of distributed energy resources.
We show in particular that linear tariffs always induce death
spiral when the fixed operating cost of the utility rises beyond
a certain threshold. For two-part tariffs with connection and
volumetric charges, the Ramsey pricing that optimizes myopically
social welfare subject to the revenue adequacy constraint induces
a stable equilibrium. The Ramsey pricing, however, inhibits
renewable adoption with a high connection charge. In contrast, a
two-part tariff with a small connection charge results in a stable
adoption process with a higher level of renewable adoption and
greater long-term total consumer surplus. Market data are used
to illustrate various solar adoption scenarios.
Index Terms—Adoption dynamics, equilibrium, retail tariff,
renewable integration, distributed energy resources.
I. INTRODUCTION
Death spiral for electric utilities stands for a positive feed-
back scenario in which, when the utility raises its price to cover
its cost, consumers reduce consumption. This forces the utility
to increase further its price, which lowers the consumption
even further.
The possibilities of death spiral for electric utilities have
been raised several times since 1960’s [2], and this topic has
attracted considerable attention recently, thanks to the rapid
deployment of the behind-the-meter solar photovoltaic (PV)
and other distributed energy resources such as storage. A main
difference this time is the role of disruptive technology such
as solar PV and residential storage. Both technologies have
direct impacts on the revenue of the utility.
There is some evidence supporting the underlying assump-
tions of the death spiral hypothesis. Recent reports issued
by the California Public Utility Commission (CPUC) [3], [4]
state that “From 2012 to 2016, system average rates (SAR)
across the three IOUs has increased at an annual average
of approximately 3.44%, which is well above the average
annual inflation rate of 1.3% over the same time period.”
Meanwhile, “all three utilities have experienced declines in
kWh sales, which also lead to increased rates when revenue
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requirement remains flat or rises.” Data in [5] further show that
“the flattening or declining trend in kWh sales is driven by a
changing economy, growth in the customer (so called behind-
the-meter) solar industry, increasing availability of demand
side management programs such as energy efficiency, and the
incremental proliferation of retail choice.”
The above snapshot statistics are consistent with the more
general trend discussed in one of the earliest work on death
spiral hypothesis in solar PV adoption by Cai, Adlakha, Low,
Martini, and Chandy [6]. Using data from an investor-owned
regulated utility, the results in [6] show, empirically, effects of
positive feedback loop on PV adoption, the loss of revenue,
and rate changes. The empirical analysis also shows that
high connection charges slow the rate of solar adoption. A
more recent empirical study [7] using nation-wide data by
Darghouth, Wiser, Barbose, and Mills, besides confirming
the general feedback phenomenon and the negative impact
of connection charges on PV adoption, shows more nuanced
effects of dynamic pricing on PV adoption.
While empirical studies suggest the potential of death
spiral, they lack the predictive power on the dynamics of the
feedback loop of PV adoption and its policy implications. With
decreasing costs of solar PV, there is a need for a fundamental
understanding of the PV adoption dynamics and impacts of
key parameters in the adoption process. Such parameters
include the cost of solar, tax incentives, and the operating cost
of the utility.
A. Summary of Results
This paper complements existing empirical studies such
as [6], [7] with an analytical study on the dynamics of PV
adoption. In particular, we aim to shed lights on the following
questions:
• Can death spiral happen under the current tariff?
• What are the conditions and pricing mechanisms for a
stable adoption* of renewable technology?
• What is the maximum installation capacity (referred to
as the limiting capacity) achievable by a stable adoption
process?
• Does a higher level of renewable penetration imply
greater social welfare?
The main contribution of this work is an analytical frame-
work that allows us to study the PV adoption process as a
*In economics, the process of adoption of technology is also often referred
to technology diffusion [8]. In this paper, we use the word adoption in place of
diffusion to avoid a conflict of terminology with the control theoretic notion
of diffusion.
2nonlinear dynamical system. This model captures interactions
between a regulated utility and its price-elastic and net-
metered† consumers who maximize consumer surplus and
make PV adoption decisions based on the payback time of
the solar investments. Such decisions are influenced by the
tariff set by the regulator and the cost of solar PV.
By analyzing the nonlinear system with the tariff and the
installed solar capacity as its states, we establish four main
theorems on the dynamics of the solar PV adoption process:
(i) the existence condition of death spiral in Theorem 1 and its
application to the Ramsey linear tariff; (ii) the condition for
stable adoption in Theorem 2; (iii) the stability of the adoption
process induced by the Ramsey two-part tariff in Theorem
3; and (iv) the achievability of limiting adoption capacity in
Theorem 4. These conditions are applied to benchmark tariff
policies.
A main conclusion of this work is that linear tariffs are
prone to induce death spiral; so are the two-part tariffs with
arbitrarily set connection charges. On the other hand, the
Ramsey pricing with the optimized volumetric and connection
charges guarantees a stable adoption. The high connection
charge of the Ramsey price, however, has a negative impact on
PV adoption. We show, in fact, that Ramsey pricing stalls PV
adoption. In contrast, a mechanism that adds a small connec-
tion charge induces a stable adoption process that achieves a
higher level of PV adoption. We demonstrate in addition that,
while maximizing the immediate overall consumer surplus,
Ramsey pricing may generate smaller consumer surplus in the
long run.
We also report an empirical study using wholesale and retail
prices, demand data, estimated revenue, consumption profiles,
and roof-top solar in New York city. In this setting, we study
the potential of death spiral and effects of tariff on solar
adoption and consumer surplus under short-run and long-run
analysis models. The main conclusion of this study is twofold.
First, the default tariff (a two-part tariff) by Consolidated
Edison (ConEd) of New York does not lead to death spiral,
and it offers a comfortable stability margin. Second, there is a
potential to increase the level of stable adoption and consumer
surplus in the long run if the current connection charge is
lowered judiciously.
The literature is limited on the dynamics of PV adoption
beyond the empirical studies in [6], [7] and economic analysis
[2]. To our best knowledge, this work appears to be the first
to pursue an analytical characterization of the PV adoption
dynamics in the framework of nonlinear dynamical feedback
systems.
In many ways, whereas our results corroborate conclusions
in [2], [6], [7], we provide deeper analytical insights into the
role of tariff on the adoption process including how connection
charges affect the level of adoption and ways to mitigate the
threat of death spiral. For instance, there is a consensus that,
although the possibility of death spiral is real in the era of
†Net-metering stands for the mechanism where a consumer is charged by
the net-consumption of electricity, which is equivalent to allowing a consumer
sell locally generated electricity back to the utility.
greater DER, the likelihood of a death spiral occurring is small,
especially if the regulator and the utility set the tariff policy
proactively, including the proper use of connection charges [2].
Our analysis is consistent with these conclusions. We provide,
however, qualitative and quantitative answers on how such
proactive measures can be applied dynamically.
B. Related Work
The design of retail tariff in the distribution system is
an instance of the classical pricing problem for a regulated
monopoly [9]. In approving a proposed tariff, the regulator
takes into account the impact of the tariff on overall social
welfare, fairness, and societal concerns. In such a setting, the
classical Ramsey pricing aims to maximize the social welfare
subject to the break-even constraint for the utility [9], [10]. In
this context, we consider the class of linear tariffs and the class
of (nonlinear) two-part tariffs defined by a connection charge
and a vector volumetric charge. Originally studied by Oi in his
seminal work [11], the two-part tariff is now widely adopted by
utilities for residential customers in the United States where
nearly 87% of the residential customers face some form of
connection charges [12].
Tariff models for electricity markets with stochastic demand
have been extensively studied. See e.g., [13] and references
therein. With the increasing presence of distributed energy
resources (DER), there is heightened attention on different
types of tariffs [14]. In such settings, the Ramsey pricing
problem for the retail utility in distribution systems with
stochastic distributed energy resources is considered in [15]–
[18]. Our dynamic model builds upon the analysis of retail
tariff design in [17], [18].
A key component of our analysis is to incorporate a solar PV
adoption model. Prior studies have modeled the PV adoption in
two ways. A number of them are based directly on the discrete
choice model [6], [19]. Other studies apply existing adoption
models for innovation that capture higher level characteristics
of the so-called S-curve [20] such as market potential and
adoption fraction [7], [21], [22]. The separable formulation
of market potential in the second way fits directly to the
stability analysis of the investigated dynamical system. To
this end, we adopt a widely used S-curve model for the
aggregated consumer behavior [8], [23], [24], under an implicit
assumption of successful PV adoption.
II. CONSUMER, RETAILER, AND ADOPTION MODELS
A. Retail Tariff Structure
We consider retail tariffs that are uniformly applied to all
consumers. We assume that the retailer sets tariff T that is
subject to approval by the regulator periodically, say, on a
daily, monthly or yearly basis. In the rate-setting period k, the
tariff Tk is fixed until the next period.
Mathematically, tariff is a pricing policy that maps con-
sumptions to payment. To this end, we consider two classes
of tariffs that are widely used in practice:
Two widely applied tariff classes are considered:
31) Linear tariff : TL = {T : T (d) = π⊤d} where d ∈ RN
is a vector of consumptions. Here N is the number of
consumption periods in a billing cycle and d the vector
of consumptions referred to as the (load) consumption
profile. Vector π ∈ RN is the the vector of marginal
prices of electricity. We say price π is a time varying (or
dynamic) when the consumptions are priced differently
over time, and the price is flat when all entries of π
are the same. The class of flat tariffs is thus defined as
TF = {T : T (d) = (πF1⊤d}.
2) Two-part (affine) tariff: TA = {T : T (d) = A + π⊤d}
where A is the connection charge independent of the
consumption.
Evidently, TF is a subclass of TL, and TL a subclass of TA.
B. Consumer Decision Model
We assume price-elastic demands, and consumer i’s demand
depends on the local random state ωi ∈ RN that is assumed
to be an exogenous random process.
We assume that, for a given tariff T set by the retailer,
each consumer decides its consumption by maximizing the
consumer surplus: it follows from [15], [17] that knowing the
tariff T , consumer i who maximizes his surplus solves the
multistage stochastic problem:
csi(T ) = max
q
E
[
ui(q, ωi)− T (q − ri(ωi))
]
, (1)
where ui(q, ωi) is the utility of consuming q, and ri(ωi) the
realized behind-the-meter renewable generation for consumer
i. In (1), csi(T ) is the (optimized) consumer surplus under
tariff T , and the optimized consumption, denoted asDi(T, ωi),
is consumer i’s load profile. Note that the consumer’s decision
does not depend directly on the wholesale price electricity due
to the implicit assumption that the consumer does not have
access to real-time price in the wholesale market; once the
price of electricity is set, the consumption decision depends
only on the tariff and the local state variable.
With total M consumers in the service area of the utility,
the expected consumer surplus under a two-part tariff is
cs(T,R) = E[U(T, ω)− π⊤(D(T, ω)−Rr0(ω))]−MA, (2)
where ω = (ω1, · · · , ωM ) is the random state of all customers,
U(T, ω) =
∑
i ui(Di(T, ωi), ωi) the aggregated utility and
D(T, ω) =
∑
iDi(T, ωi) the aggregated demand, respec-
tively. The first term on the right hand side of (2) is the
aggregated consumer utility, the second the total volumetric
charge, and the last the total connection charge. The total
renewable generated behind the meter is given by Rr0(ω)
where r0(ω) is the renewable generation per unit-capacity
installed and R the total installed capacity.
C. Retailer Decision Model
We model the retail utility as a regulated monopoly, which
is the case in most parts of the United States. Here we assume
that the retailer imports electricity from the wholesale market
to satisfy the aggregated demand of its customers. The retailer
is assumed to be a price taker‡. This model is a reasonable
approximation of the deregulated two-settlement electricity
market.
The retailer sets the tariff and seeks its approval by the reg-
ulator in each tariff-setting period. As a regulated monopoly,
the retailer is allowed to break even. The revenue adequacy
condition is met by setting the retail surplus to zero. The retail
surplus is defined as
rs(T, θ, R) = E[(π−λ)⊤(D(π, ω)−Rr0(ω))]+MA−θ (3)
where θ is the operating cost of the utility, λ ∈ RN the
wholesale price of electricity, and (D(π, ω)) − Rr0(ω)) the
net consumption. The expectation is taken over λ and ω.
The first term on the right-hand side is the revenue from
energy consumption. The second term (MA) is the revenue
from the connection charge. The break-even condition can be
satisfied by jointly allocating these two types of revenue to
the operating cost of the utility.
Under the break-even constraint, the retailer has additional
dimensions of freedom to set the tariff to achieve a variety
of objectives, including maximizing consumer surplus and
enhancing the overall social welfare. To this end, we model
the retailer’s pricing decision by a tariff policy µ that maps
its expected future operating cost θ and the current level of
renewable adoption R to a tariff T in some tariff class in the
next period. In particular, at the end of the kth period, the
tariff in the next period Tk+1 in either TL or TA is given by
µ : Tk+1 = µ(Rk, θk)
where Rk is the installed capacity at the end of period k and
θk is the utility’s expected fixed cost
§.
An important type of tariff policy is Ramsey pricing in
which the retailer maximizes the total surplus¶ subject to the
revenue adequacy constraint. Equivalently, the retailer solves
the following constrained optimization to determine Tk+1
given the current level of renewable installation Rk and the
(expected) fixed cost θk in the next period:
µ∗ : max
T∈T
cs(T,Rk) s.t. rs(T, θk, Rk) = 0. (4)
where T ∈ {TA,TL} is the tariff class. Let µ∗A and µ∗L be the
Ramsey pricing for the two-part tariff and linear tariff classes,
respectively.
D. Technology Adoption Model
We now present a dynamical system for the adoption of dis-
tributed energy resources such as solar PV and energy storage.
We assume that the adoption decision of a residential customer
is based on his investment’s payback time, which depends on
the cost of solar PV and the reduced payment for consumption.
‡A large retail utility, strictly speaking, can influence the wholesale price
of electricity.
§Rigorously speaking, the tariff Tk+1 should take into account not only
installed PV in Rk but also new installations in period k+1, which depends
on the cost of solar ξ. For simplicity, we ignore the dependency of ξ.
¶The sum of consumer and retail surpluses is sometimes referred to as
social welfare.
4Instead of considering individual adoption decisions, we model
the adoption process for the entire customer population.
Following the standard innovation adoption theory [24], for
a given tariff T and per-unit (kWh) PV purchasing cost ξ, let
the installed renewable capacity in aggregation be s(t, T, ξ) at
time t. Illustrated in Fig. 1, s(t, T, ξ) is referred to as the PV
adoption curve and is defined by the following equation:
s(t, T, ξ) = R∞(T, ξ)η(t), (5)
where R∞(T, ξ) is the market potential of the PV adoption,
and the cumulative installed fraction η(t) is a sigmoid function
satisfying η(0) = 0 and lim
t→∞
η(t) = 1. The interpretation of
the market potential is that, for fixed tariff T and constant
exogenous input ξ, the level of adoption eventually reaches
R∞(T, ξ).
t
R∞(T,ξ)
s(t,T,ξ)
PSfrag replacements
t
s(t, T, ξ)
R∞(T, ξ)
Fig. 1. Renewable adoption for fixed market potential.
Note that the shape of the adoption curve makes the model
follow the so-called S-curve adoption of innovation. This
model has been used to model the adoption of renewable
technology, and there is a parametric form of R∞(T, ξ) that
can be used in practice [25]. A well known form of η(t) is
from the Bass model [20].
The adoption curve s(t, T, ξ) does not capture the dynamics
of the adoption process, however; it only describes the evolu-
tion of the adoption for fixed tariff T and PV cost ξ throughout
the adoption process. In reality, the tariff is set by the utility
periodically and the cost of PV declines. The evolution of
the actual installed PV capacity in each period depends not
only on the tariff and cost in that period but also on those
in previous periods. In other words, the installed PV capacity
has to be calculated using not a single but a collection of such
S-curves. The dynamics of PV capacity evolution is presented
in Section III.
III. DYNAMICS AND STABILITY OF ADOPTION
A. Dynamics of Technology Adoption
We now introduce a discrete-time dynamical system model
for the PV adoption process where the time index k cor-
responds to the rate-setting epoch of the retailer. The state
σk = (Tk, Rk) of the dynamical system includes the tariff Tk
set by the retailer at the beginning of the tariff period and
the installed PV capacity Rk at the end of the tariff period.
t
R∞(Tk+1,ξk)
s(t,T,ξ)
k k+1
R∞(Tk,ξk-1)Rk+1
Rk
s(t,Tk,ξk-1)
s(t,Tk+1,ξk)
Fig. 2. Dynamics of renewable adoption when R∞(Tk+1, ξk) ≥ Rk .
The evolution of the system state is governed by the system
equation
σk+1 = f(σk, χk), (6)
where χk = (θk, ξk) is the exogenous (input) process contain-
ing the expected operating cost θk and the per-unit purchasing
cost of PV ξk. In analyzing the stability of the adoption
process, we set the exogenous input to constant, χk = χ. In
general, the exogenous input can be time varying, especially
when we consider controlled adoption that sets tariff in
response to varying costs. See case studies and qualitative
results given in Section IV-B.
The state evolution is assumed Markovian following
Rk → Tk+1 → Rk+1
that corresponds to the decision process of the retailer who
observes the level of adoptionRk before setting the tariff Tk+1
for the next period. Note that, at the beginning of period k+1,
the installed PV capacity is Rk. The installed capacity Rk+1
at the end of the period k + 1 is obtained from the adoption
curve associated with Tk+1 by s(tk+1, Tk+1, ξk) where tk is
such that s(tk, Tk+1, ξk) = Rk.
A particularly relevant pricing policy is the myopic (greedy)
Ramsey pricing that maximizes the consumer surplus subject
to the break-even constraint in each period:
Tk+1 = argmax
T∈T ,rs(T,θk,Rk)=0
cs(T,Rk), (7)
Rk+1 =
{
Rk, if R∞(Tk+1, ξk) < Rk;
s(1 + η−1( Rk
R∞(Tk+1,ξk)
), Tk+1, ξk), o.w.
(8)
Fig. 2 illustrates the evolution of the system state. Suppose
that at time k, the tariff is Tk and the installed capacity is Rk
on the (blue) adoption curve s(t, Tk, ξk−1). Given (Rk, Tk), a
new tariff Tk+1 is obtained for the next period, which has the
(red) adoption curve s(t, Tk+1, ξk). By shifting s(t, Tk+1, ξk)
such that it intersects s(t, Tk, ξk−1) at Rk, we obtain the
installed capacity Rk+1 for the (k + 1)th period.
A comment on the conditions in (8) is in order. Typi-
cally, especially at the early stage of adoption, tariff Tk+1
5will set the adoption curve to one with higher market po-
tential as illustrated in Fig. 2. However, the situation that
R∞(Tk+1, ξk) < Rk can happen when there is an exogenous
shock such as a policy intervention such that (Tk+1, ξk) leads
to an adoption curve that has a lower market potential. For
instance, the regulator may remove a certain tax incentive for
PV adoption, which makes PV adoption less attractive and
halts the adoption process.
B. Death Spiral and its Existence Conditions
The notion of death spiral is associated with the trajectory
of a dynamical system defined through the tariff policy µ and
the adoption curve.
Definition 1 (Death spiral and critical adoption level). An
evolution of the dynamical system (7-8) states starting from
σ0 is a death spiral induced by tariff policy µ if it reaches a
state σko for which the optimization (7) to determine Tko+1 is
not feasible. The critical adoption level R♯µ is the supremum
of R at which a revenue adequate tariff exists
R♯µ = sup{R : rs(µ(R, θ), θ, R) = 0}. (9)
We now establish a structural results on the critical adoption
level.
Proposition 1. The critical adoption level R♯ is monotonically
decreasing on the retailer cost θ.
We now focus on establishing existing conditions of death
spiral. We assume exogenous parameters χ = (θ, ξ) are fixed
in this analysis. For brevity, we drop notational dependencies
on θ, ξ, and χ when no confusion arises, and include them
when the dependency on them plays a role in the analysis.
Our analysis relies on the characterization of the market
potential function defined as follows.
Definition 2 (Market Potential function). Given a tariff policy
µ, the market potential function at adoption level R is defined
as
pµ(R) = R∞(µ(R)). (10)
The market potential function serves as a surrogate for the
more complicated iterative map f in (6). Being the maximum
installation capacity on the adoption curve, pµ(R) measures
the headroom beyond the current installation capacity R.
The existence condition for death spiral is stated in Theorem
1 and illustrated in Fig. 3. Specifically, the death spiral occurs
if the gap between pµ(R) and R is strictly positive in the left
neighborhood of the critical adoption R♯.
Theorem 1 (Existence condition of death spiral). Given an
initial state σ0 with R0 < R
♯, a tariff policy µ generates a
death spiral if there exists an ǫ > 0 such that
• Rk0 ∈ (R♯ − ǫ, R♯] for some k0 ≥ 0;
• pµ(R) > R for all R ∈ (R♯ − ǫ, R♯].
The condition is necessary and sufficient if pµ(R) is mono-
tonically increasing in R.
Theorem 1 provides a way to check, at least numerically, the
possibility of death spiral. It is significant that the conditions
R
pμ(R)
R#R#- ϵ
pμ(R)=R
Fig. 3. Condition for death spiral as stated in Theorem 1.
in Theorem 1 are necessary and sufficient when the market
potential function is monotonically increasing as in most
empirical cases studied in this paper. The following Lemma
provides a condition for the monotonicity of pµ(R) with
respect to R and θ.
Lemma 1 (Monotonicity of market potential function). The
market potential function pµ(R, θ) for the Ramsey linear
flat tariff µ∗F is monotonically increasing in θ. It is also
monotonically increasing in R if, at the initial state when
R = 0, the expected revenue from selling renewable in the
retail market is higher than that in the wholesale market.
The condition for the monotonicity of pµ(R, θ) with respect
to R is natural since the retail price at the initial stage is almost
always higher than the wholesale price, and the renewable
incentive policy such as net-metering naturally ensures that
the condition in Lemma 1 holds.
We can now specialize Theorem 1 on the Ramsey linear
tariff µ∗L that maximizes the consumer surplus subject to a
revenue adequacy constraint.
Corollary 1 (Death spiral condition for Ramsey linear tariff).
Assume that for the Ramsey linear tariff µ∗L, pµ∗L(R, θ) is
monotonically increasing with respect to retailer cost θ. There
exists a threshold θ† such that µ∗L at any retailer cost θ > θ
†
induces a death spiral.
In particular, we can calculate the death spiral thresholds θ†
for Ramsey linear flat tariff with some additive assumptions
(see Corollary 2 in the Appendix).
C. Stable Adoption
Death spiral is a form of instability. We now consider
conditions for stable adoption. In this context, we assume that
both θ and ξ are fixed.
We begin with standard definitions of the equilibrium and
conditions for the stable equilibrium.
Definition 3 (Stable equilibrium and stable adoption). For the
state evolution defined in (6),
1) A state σ∗ is an equilibrium if σ∗ = f(σ∗).
2) An equilibrium σ∗ is Lyapunov stable if, for each ǫ > 0,
there exists a δ = δ(ǫ) such that, for every trajectory
6(σ0, σ1, · · ·) that is not a death spiral, ‖σ0 − σ∗‖ < δ
implies ‖σk − σ∗‖ < ǫ for all k > 0.
3) A trajectory (σ0, σ1, · · ·) is a stable adoption if it
converges to a stable equilibrium.
Theorem 2 (Equilibrium, stability, and stable adoption).
Given a tariff policy µ and a market potential function pµ(R),
if R∗ satisfies pµ(R∗) ≤ R∗, then σ∗ = (µ(R∗), R∗) is an
equilibrium. Furthermore,
1) σ∗ is Lyapunov stable if there exists an ǫ > 0 such that
pµ(R) ≤ R for all R ∈ (R∗, R∗ + ǫ);
2) A trajectory (σ0, σ1, · · · , σk0 , · · ·) is a stable adoption
with lim
k→∞
σk = σ
∗ if we have ∀R ∈ (R∗ − ǫ, R∗),
R < pµ(R) ≤ R∗ and Rk0 ∈ (R∗ − ǫ, R∗) for some
k0 ≥ 0.
This equilibrium condition is intuitive; it states the case
when the current level of installed PV capacity R already
reaches R∞(µ(R)). If p(R∗) < R∗, from (8), (µ(R∗), R∗)
is also an equilibrium. The first item in Theorem 2 provides
the general existence condition of a stable equilibrium. Under
this condition, a adoption reaching the right neighborhood of
R∗ simply stays there. That said, for the case illustrated in
Fig. 4, any capacity no less than the intersection is a stable
equilibrium. In the second item, we specify a stable adoption
that converges to σ∗. The graphical illustration is given in the
area of Fig. 4 shaded in yellow, with the intersection equal to
the capacity of convergence.
R
pμ(R)
R*+ ϵR*- ϵ
pμ(R)=R
R*
Fig. 4. Condition for stability as stated in Theorem 2.
Theorem 3 (Stable adoption via Ramsey two-part tariff). For
any initial state σ0 = (T0, R0) with 0 ≤ R0 ≤ pµ∗
A
(0), the
Ramsey two-part tariff µ∗A induces a adoption approaching to
the unique stable equilibrium (µ∗A(pµ∗A(0)), pµ∗A(0)).
Theorem 3 implies that the Ramsey two-part tariff can
induce a stable adoption regardless of the values of θ and ξ. It
turns out that the solar adoption level at the stable equilibrium
is quite low in such cases. The reason is that Ramsey two-part
tariff µ∗A does not rely on markups in the volumetric price to
achieve revenue adequacy, and it is the markups on volumetric
prices that represent a strong incentive for PV adoption. Under
the Ramsey pricing, the retail cost θ is recovered uniformly
from the connection charges. Furthermore, the volumetric
price of µ∗A does not depend on the solar integration capacity.
The following lemma provides a so-called critical connec-
tion charge that guarantees a stable adoption for two-part
tariffs.
Lemma 2 (Stable adoption via critical connection charge). Let
θ♯ = min
R
(max
π
(E[(π − λ)⊤(D(π, ω)) − Rr0(ω)])). All two-
part tariffs with fixed connection charge A♯ = (θ − θ♯)/M
induces a stable adoption.
Here, the max operation gives the maximum value of
revenue a retailer extract from the consumers. From Definition
1, revenue at R♯ matches the retailer’s operating cost θ. With
the min operation, θ♯ means that, for any renewable adoption
R, the retailer can always find a price π such that its fixed cost
θ♯ is covered. Therefore, by intuition, linear tariffs refrain from
death spiral if the retailer cost is no more than θ♯.
D. Limiting Diffusion Capacity
In this subsection, we are interested in finding the highest
level of PV adoption R† achievable by a stable adoption. The
following definition formalizes the notion of limiting adoption
capacity.
Definition 4 (Limiting adoption capacity). The limiting adop-
tion capacity for a tariff class is the supremum of the installed
capacity associated with a stable equilibrium achievable by a
stable adoption.
Note that the highest consumer surplus can be achieved at
the limiting adoption capacity (if the PV cost is considered
as sunk cost and the tariff is properly designed). From (9) we
know that the critical adoption level for a tariff class is the
same for all tariff policies (including the Ramsey tariff) that
satisfy the break-even condition. Let R♯µL(θ) be the critical
adoption level for linear tariffs under retailer cost θ. The
following theorem characterizes the limiting adoption capacity
for two-part tariffs satisfying the break-even constraint. Note
that R♯µL(θ) is sufficient to include the critical adoption levels
under two-part tariffs since (3) shows the connection charge
A and retailer cost θ are homogeneous in the expression of
retail surplus.
Theorem 4 (Limiting capacity characterization). Assume 1)
p(R♯µL(θ)) is increasing on θ, and 2) p(R
♯
µL
(θ)) ≥ p(R) for
all 0 ≤ R ≤ R♯µL(θ) and θ ≥ 0. The limiting capacity R◦ for
two-part tariffs subject to the break-even condition is equal to
R♯µL(θ
◦), where θ◦ satisfies p(R♯µL(θ
◦)) = R♯µL(θ
◦).
Fig. 5 gives an illustration for Theorem 4. The shaded
part represents all break-even linear tariff policies under a
particular retailer cost. The blue dots represent the critical
adoption levels when the retailer cost changes. The red dot at
the intersection is the limiting capacity. To achieve the limiting
capacity requires a complicated control of the tariff policy.
For example, the tariff policy may require constant changes
of the connection charge and the volumetric price which are
impractical in practice.
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Fig. 5. Limiting capacity for two-part tariffs as stated in Theorem 4.
Currently we cannot characterize a specific tariff policy
that achieves the limiting capacity. However, one can obtain a
capacity lower bound for the limiting capacity by restricting
tariff policies to those with a fixed connection charge and
volumetric price µ∗L. Assume that the market potential function
p(R, θ) of the Ramsey linear tariff µ∗L is monotonically
increasing with respect to retailer cost θ. If µ∗L induces a death
spiral, by adding the minimum connection charge (limiting
connection charge) so that there is a stable adoption, we can
find the maximum adoption under such tariff policies at the
equilibrium (We name this adoption level as the capacity lower
bound).
Furthermore, if the volumetric price is flat (µ∗F), and the
assumption in Corollary 2 holds, the capacity lower bound is
R† and the fixed connection charge that achieves the capacity
lower bound is A† = (θ − θ†)/M .
IV. AN EMPIRICAL STUDY
We analyzed renewable adoption dynamics in both short-
run and long-run cases within a hypothetical distribution utility
facing the wholesale price and residential demand in New York
City. The same settings of linear demand model, consumption
profile, revenue estimation, and solar PV data weer used as in
[17], [18].
The default tariff of the Consolidated Edison Company of
New York (ConEd) in 2015 for its 2.2 million residential
customers was a two-part tariff TCE with a connection charge
ACE equal to $0.52/day and a flat volumetric price πCE equal
to $0.172/kWh. We substituted the prevailing retail tariff TCE
into the utility’s break-even condition in (4) to estimate the
utility’s daily fixed costs, which amount to θCE = $6.03M. A
consumer surplus of cs0(T
CE) = $9.54M was assumed as in
[17].
The integration of solar PV was modeled based on a sim-
ulated 5kW-DC-capacity rooftop system in NYC. The market
potential R∞ was computed based on the expected payback
years tPB = ξ/E[π⊤r0(ω)] at the time of purchasing. We
took the solar PV cost of NYC in 2015 as the initial solar
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Fig. 6. Potential function in short run analysis.
cost ξ0 = $4250/kW
||. An exponential fit in [25] was adopted
in calculating the market potential: R∞ = RMS · e−0.3tPB . As
in [21], the total market size RMS was set to be 90% of all
customers installing, and η(t) was set to model a medium-rate
adoption using the Bass model.
A. Short-run Analysis
In the short-run analysis, exogenous parameters including
the retailer’s cost and the solar cost were fixed during the
evolution of states. We examined both flat and dynamic tariffs.
Fig. 6 shows the market potential functions under different
tariff policies with flat volumetric prices. For each tariff class,
the market potential function was increasing with respect to
solar capacity (The market potential function of Ramsey two-
part tariff was horizontal). The equilibrium adoption capacity
of the Ramsey two-part tariff µ∗A was almost at 0, which stalled
the solar adoption (green curve). This phenomenon was due
to the low volumetric price under such tariff policy, leading to
long payback time. The two-part tariff with volumetric price
µ∗F and fixed connection charge A
CE (as currently used by
ConEd), induced a stable equilibrium with the solar capacity
equal to 97.7MW (brown curve).
When the retailer cost was increased by about 10% to
$6.65M, Ramsey linear flat tariff µ∗F induced a death spiral
(blue curve). When a connection charge A ≥ $0.088/day was
introduced, the tariff stayed off the death spiral and achieved
a stable equilibrium. Moreover, when the connection charge
A† = $0.088/day (less than 20% of the current ConEd’s)
was imposed, the capacity lower bound R† could be achieved
(magenta curve) at 0.7M kW (the limiting capacity is 1M
kW). A connection charge higher than A† will induce a
stable adoption. The difference between A† and the current
connection charge imposed by ConEd revealed that the current
connection charge not only avoided the death spiral, but also
left an adequate stability margin even when the retailer’s
operating cost rose by 10%.
Similar market potential function curves with a lower solar
cost are shown in Fig. 7. Lowering solar cost by more than
||The solar cost data in New York State starting from 2009 can be found at
https://www.nysolarmap.com/
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Fig. 7. Potential functions of Ramsey two-part tariff µ∗
A
, linear tariff µ∗
F
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F
and limiting connection charge.
75% leads to a significantly higher level of adoption. The
current ConEd tariff at $0.51/day that induced stable adoption
when the solar cost was high induced death spiral. The death
spiral can be mitigated by increasing the connection charge to
$1.51/day.
Fig. 8 shows the market potential functions under different
tariff policies with time-varying volumetric prices. The market
potential function might not be increasing on solar capacity in
this case (while the market potential function of Ramsey two-
part tariff is still horizontal). The adoption equilibrium of the
Ramsey two-part tariff µ∗A was almost at 0, which stalled the
solar adoption (green curves) as well. The critical connection
charge (A♯ = $0.97/day), regardless of solar costs, induced
stable adoptions (brown curves) which have higher equilibrium
capacity than under µ∗A.
B. Long-run Analysis
Fig. 9 shows a comparison of total consumer surplus be-
tween two two-part tariffs over 20 years. One tariff policy
was the Ramsey two-part tariff µ∗A, the other was the two-part
tariff with the connection charge A†=$1.51/day and volumetric
price µ∗F. In both cases, the solar cost ($912/kW) and retailer
cost were fixed.
As shown in Fig. 9, the total consumer surplus induced
by µ∗A had slow growth. Under the two-part tariff with A
†,
the consumer surplus was low at first but eventually became
higher than under µ∗A due to a higher solar installation.
This comparison illustrated the trade-off in achieving long-
run consumer surplus optimization: the need to add connection
charge for cost recovery and the need to limit the connection
charge to promote PV adoption. The Ramsey two-part tariff
µ∗A, which maximizes the consumer surplus greedily, is not
the optimal choice for consumer surplus maximization in the
long run.
Fig. 10 illustrates effects of connection charge on the PV
adoption capacity and the consumer surplus. As the connection
charge increased from the minimum (limiting) connection
charge of $1.51/day to the maximum (Ramsey) connection
charge of $2.74/day, the adoption capacity decreased for all
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Fig. 9. Consumer surplus induced by Ramsey two-part tariff µ∗
A
and two-part
tariff with limiting connection charge.
years. The lower panel of Fig. 10 shows that the limiting
connection charge does not necessarily lead to the highest
consumer surplus, which was achieved at the fixed connection
charge of A=$1.78/day.
In this context, total consumer surplus does not fully capture
the effect of solar cost. We define, for the long run numerical
studies, a (narrow) notion of social welfare that includes the
cost of PV, specifically, sw =
∑
year cs−R · ξ. We show how
9200
15
0.5
1.51
1
Time 
(year)
1.5
× 106
So
la
r 
Ca
pa
ci
ty
 (k
W
)
10
2
A ($/day)
2.06
2.5
5
2.74 0
0 5 10 15
Time (year)
1.485
1.49
1.495
1.5
1.505
1.51
1.515
Co
n
su
m
e
r 
Su
rp
lu
s 
($)
× 107
A=$1.51/day
A=$1.65/day
A=$1.78/day
A=$1.92/day
A=$2.06/day
A=$2.19/day
A=$2.33/day
A=$2.47/day
A=$2.6/day
A=$2.74/day
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social welfare changes over the years in Fig. 11. Although
Fig. 10 has shown the increase of consumer surplus caused
by more PV capacity, Fig. 11 reveals that the highest social
welfare achieves at A=$2.74/day, which means the increase
of aggregated surplus brought by PV installation cannot cover
the cost of solar within the time scope of this case (20 years).
However, this situation may change if we look at a longer time
scale, due to the surplus superiority and saturation of new PV
installation.
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Fig. 11. Cumulative social welfare under different connection charges.
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Fig. 12. Long-run solar adoption with retailer cost increasing by 2% every
year from θCE.
Fig. 12 and Fig. 13 show the long-run solar adoption
dynamics (flat volumetric prices) under processes of increasing
retailer cost and decreasing solar cost. In both cases, death
spiral was induced under the same tariff. Adding limiting
connection charges, however, could stay off the death spiral
and achieve stable adoptions (magenta curve). Moreover, while
introducing limiting connection charges lowered the speed of
solar integration, its adoption capacity was higher than under
fixed connection charge in the long run. The fixed connection
charge case generates a death spiral which stalls further solar
adoption.
Although it is beyond the scope of this paper to analyze
the adoption process with varying costs, some insights could
be gained from the numerical studies. Fig. 12 shows that
increasing retailer costs does not affect the capacity lower
bound (dashed magenta line). If the connection charge keeps
unchanged (blue curve), the death spiral is induced, even faster
than under fixed retailer cost θ. The reason is that increasing
θ not only accelerates PV adoption by lifting market potential
but also lowers the critical adoption level R♯. In Fig. 13, we
show that decreasing solar costs does not change the critical
adoption level (blue dashed line). The death spiral still comes
earlier because of the lifting market potential. The capacity
lower bound rises with solar cost decrease. The effect of
increasing wholesale prices (not plotted here) is similar to
a combination of the above. The death spiral occurs faster
because of the growing market potential and lowered critical
adoption level. The capacity lower bound also increases in this
case.
V. CONCLUSION
The goal of developing an analytical framework for char-
acterizing the dynamics of PV adoption is to obtain insights
into the behavior of the adoption process and roles of tariff
on adoption. Based on the analysis, several conclusions can
be made. First, linear tariffs are prone to death spiral when
the fixed cost of the utility rises beyond a certain level. Our
model also allows us to quantify situations when death spiral is
imminent. Second, a small connection charge has the effect of
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from ξ0.
stimulating adoption whereas a high connection charge tends
to inhibit adoption. Our analysis provides a way to set the
right level of connection charge to induce a stable adoption
process and greater adoption capacity.
Finally, we comment on some of the limitations of this paper
and future work. The current analytical model does not include
so-called partial net-metering as proposed by some public
utility commissions. The difference of such a mechanism with
net-metering is that it compensates the electricity sent back to
the grid at a price lower than the retail price. The changed
pricing structure thus significantly increases the difficulty
of integrating the consumer decision model into adoption
dynamics. It might be interesting to look at how PV adoption
changes when the compensation price varies between the retail
price and the wholesale price.
Another issue we have not addressed is the design of
retail tariff that achieves both incentive compatibility and
fairness in PV adoption. The current practice of net-metering
boosts the surplus of PV owners at the expense of non-PV
owners. Possible solutions may include differentiated pricing
for consumers with/without PV installations and (load profile)
data-driven tariff design.
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APPENDIX
Proposition 2. For a linear tariff π♯ = µ(R♯, θ) at the critical
adoption capacity R♯, we have
π♯ = argmax
π
rs(T, θ, R♯).
Denote
rsM(A, θ,R♯) = max
π
rs(T, θ, R♯).
The relation among T, π, and A are defined in Section II-A.
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Proof:. If there exists a π0 such that
rs(T0, θ, R
♯) > rs(T ♯, θ, R♯) = 0,
there must exist R′ > R♯ satisfying rs(T0, θ, R′) > 0 due
to the continuity. Thus a contradiction is induced with the
definition of critical adoption level.
Proof of Proposition 1:. Leveraging Proposition 2, for a re-
tailer cost θ1 and the corresponding critical adoption level R
♯
1,
we have rsM(A, θ1, R
♯
1) = 0. Hence, with the expression of
rs in (3), we have rsM(A, θ2, R
♯
1) < 0 for all θ2 > θ1. Thus
R♯2 < R
♯
1.
Proposition 3. For a trajectory (σ0, σ1, · · ·), if p(Rk) > Rk,
we have Rk < Rk+1 = h(Rk, µ(Rk, θ)) < p(Rk).
Proof:. It directly holds from Equation (8).
Proposition 4. If there is an ǫ > 0 such that R < p(R) ≤ R∗
for all R ∈ (R∗ − ǫ, R∗) with p(R∗) = R∗, then for each
R0 ∈ (R∗ − ǫ, R∗), we have lim
k→∞
Rk = R
∗.
Proof:. Leveraging Proposition 3, {Rt} is strictly increasing
and bounded by R∗. We suppose that {Rt} converges to R′ ∈
(R0, R
∗). It can be induced that h(R′, µ(R′, θ)) = R′. As
p(R′) > R′, there is a contradiction with Proposition 3. Hence
{Rk} must converge to R∗ (Monotone convergence theorem).
Proof of Theorem 1. Sufficiency ⇒: Leveraging Proposition
3, {Rk} is monotonically increasing. Suppose R♯ is an upper
bound of {Rk}. Thus there exists an R′ ∈ (Rk0, R♯] such
that {Rk} converges to R′ (Monotone convergence theorem).
Hence, h(R′, µ(R′, θ)) = R′. As p(R′) > R′, there is a
contradiction with Proposition 3. Thus R♯ is not an upper
bound of {Rk}, indicating that the death spiral occurs.
If p(R) is monotonically increasing, the necessity can also
be proved.
Necessity ⇐: Since a death spiral is induced, there must
exist R0 ≤ Rk1 < R♯ such that p(Rk1) > R♯ (Otherwise
Rk+1 < p(Rk) ≤ R♯ for all k, indicating there is no
death spiral). Moreover, as p(R) is monotonically increasing,
p(R) > p(Rk1) > R
♯ > R holds for R ∈ (Rk1, R♯]. Thus the
necessity is proved.
Proof of Lemma 1. The volumetric price of the Ramsey linear
flat tariff is characterized by
π∗F =
E[λ⊤∂D(1π∗F, ω)/∂π
∗
F]
1⊤E[∂D(1π∗F, ω)/∂π
∗
F]
− γ − 1
γ
1
⊤
E[D − r(ω)]
1⊤E[∂D/∂π∗F]
(11)
where γ is the Lagrange multiplier of (4), with γ−1
γ
∈ [0, 1].
The revenue adequacy constraint can be reformulated as
(1π∗F)
⊤
E[D − r(ω)] = θ + E[λ⊤(D − r(ω))] (12)
Differentiating both sides of (12) over θ yields (after some
deduction)
∂π∗F
∂θ
(
E[(1π∗F − λ)⊤
∂D
∂π∗F
] + 1⊤E[D −Rr0(ω)]
)
= 1 (13)
Substituting (11) into (13) yields
1
γ
1
⊤
E[D −Rr0(ω)]∂π
∗
F
∂θ
= 1 (14)
It is then clear
∂π∗F
∂θ
> 0, thus p(R, θ)’s monotonicity in θ is
proved.
Differentiating both sides of (12) over R yields (after some
deduction)
E[(1π∗F − λ)⊤ ∂D∂π∗
F
∂π∗F
∂R
] + 1⊤E[D −Rr0(ω)]∂π
∗
F
∂R
= E[(1π∗F − λ)⊤r0(ω)]
(15)
Substituting (11) into (15) yields
1
γ
1
⊤
E[D −Rr0(ω)]∂π
∗
F
∂R
= E[(1π∗F − λ)⊤r0(ω)] (16)
Leveraging E[(1π∗F|R=0 − λ)⊤r0(ω)] ≥ 0, it is then clear
∂π∗F
∂R
≥ 0, thus p(R, θ)’s monotonicity in R is proved.
Proof of Corollary 1. It is not hard to observe that as θ →
+∞, the critical adoption level R♯ → 0. Hence, with Propo-
sition 1, there must exist θ† such that the market potential
function p(R, θ) meets the condition in Theorem 1. As we
assume p(R, θ) is monotonically increasing with respect to
retailer cost θ for the Ramsey linear tariff µ∗L, a retailer cost
θ > θ† will still induce a death spiral.
Proposition 5. For the Ramsey linear flat tariff, if (i) the
market potential R∞(·) is convex on the flat volumetric price
π∗F, (ii) consumers’ demand function is affine with negative
slope and random disturbance, i.e., D(π, ω) = B(ω) − Gπ,
where B(ω) is the additive disturbance and G positive
semidefinite, and (iii) the assumption in Lemma 1 holds, the
market potential function p(R, θ) is not only monotonically
increasing but also convex in θ and in R.
Proof:. Solving (4) yields
π∗F(R, θ) =
−b(R)−
√
b(R)2 − 4ac(R, θ)
2a
(17)
where a = 1⊤G1, b(R) = −λ¯⊤G1 − 1⊤(E[B(ω)] − Rr¯0),
and c(R, θ) = θ + E[λ⊤(B(ω) −Rr0(ω))].
Since the monotonicity directly holds from Lemma 1, we
only need to show the convexity. As we have assumed R∞(·)
to be convex on the the flat volumetric price π∗F, we then need
to prove π∗F(R, θ)’s convexity on θ and R.
a) On θ: Differentiating twice π∗F(R, θ) with respect to θ
we have
dπ∗F
dθ
= −12a (−4a) · 1√b(R)2−4ac(R,θ)
= 2√
b2−4ac > 0
(18)
dπ∗F
dθ2
=
2a√
b2 − 4ac(b2 − 4ac) (19)
Since a = 1⊤G1 and G positive definite, dπ
∗
dθ2
≥ 0.
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b) On R: differentiating π∗F(R, θ) with respect to R we have
π∗F(R)
′ = 12a [−b′ − (bb′ − 2ac′) · 1√b2−4ac ]
= 1
2a
√
b2−4ac [2ac
′ − bb′ − b′√b2 − 4ac]
= 1√
b2−4ac [
(−b−√b2−4ac)
2a b
′ + c′] = 1√
b2−4ac (π
∗
F(R)b
′ + c′)
(20)
where: b′ = 1⊤r¯0 and c′ = −E[λ⊤r0(ω)].
We differentiate twice π∗F(R)
π∗F(R)
′′
=
1
2a
(b′b− 2ac′)2 − (b2 − 4ac)b′2√
b2 − 4ac(b2 − 4ac) (21)
With π∗F(R)
′ ≥ 0, we have 2ac′ − bb′ − b′√b2 − 4ac ≥ 0,
which yields (b′b−2ac′)2−(b2−4ac)b′2 ≥ 0. Thus π∗F(R)′′ ≥
0 holds.
Corollary 2 (Death spiral threshold for Ramsey linear flat
tariff). For the Ramsey linear flat tariff µ∗F, if (i) the market
potential R∞(·) is convex on the flat volumetric price π∗F, (ii)
consumers’ demand function is affine with negative slope and
random disturbance, i.e., D(π, ω) = B(ω)−Gπ, where B(ω)
is the additive disturbance and G positive semidefinite, and
(iii) the assumption in Lemma 1 holds, then the minimum of
such thresholds as specified in Corollary 1 gives
θ† = 1
41⊤G1
[
b(R†)2 − 41⊤G1E[λ⊤(B(ω) −R†r0(ω))]
− (b(R†) + 21⊤G1R−1∞ (R†))2
]
,
(22)
where R† is characterized by
−dR
−1
∞ (R
†)
dR
=
R−1∞ (R
†)1⊤r¯0 − E[λ⊤r0(ω)]
b(R†) + 21⊤G1R−1∞ (R†)
, (23)
b(R) = −λ¯⊤G1 − 1⊤(E[B(ω)] − Rr¯0) and r¯0 the expected
renewable generation per unit-capacity installed.
Proof of Corollary 2. We look for the infimum of retailer
costs that induce a death spiral. With Proposition 4 and 5, such
θ† is specified when the market potential function p(R, θ) is
tangent to p = R, or when π∗F(R) tangent to R
−1
∞ (R). Thus
the tangent point can be specified by{
π∗F(R)
′ −R−1∞ (R)′ = 0
π∗F(R)−R−1∞ (R) = 0
(24)
Further deduction of the first equation yields
π∗F(R)
′ −R−1∞ (R)′ = 1√b2−4ac(π∗F(R)b′ + c′)−R−1∞ (R)′
= 1√
b2−4ac (R
−1
∞ (R)b
′ + c′)−R−1∞ (R)′
(25)
Reformulate (25) as
θ =
1
4a
[b2 − 4ac0 − (R
−1
∞ (R)b
′ + c′
R−1∞ (R)′
)2] (26)
where c0 = E[λ
⊤(B(ω)−Rr0(ω))]. Reformulating the second
equation in (24) yields
θ =
1
4a
[b2 − 4ac0 − (b + 2aR−1∞ (R))2] (27)
With (26) and (27), we can solve R† which is characterized
by
−dR
−1
∞ (R
†)
dR
=
R−1∞ (R
†)1⊤r¯0 − E[λ⊤r0(ω)]
b+ 2aR−1∞ (R†)
(28)
Substituting R† into (27) we have
θ† = 14a [b(R
†)2 − 4aE[λ⊤(B(ω)−R†r0(ω))]
−(b(R†) + 2aR−1∞ (R†))2],
(29)
Proof of Theorem 2. f(σ∗, χ) = σ∗ (the equilibrium condi-
tion) directly holds by computing the dynamics in (7) and (8).
We prove the stability by constructing the following Lya-
punov candidate function. Let σ = (T,R),
V (σ) = max(R∗, R, p(R))−min(R,R∗). (30)
A neighborhoodB of the equilibrium (T ∗, R∗) with a range
of solar capacity (v1, v2) is selected such that (i) v2 ≤ R∗+ ǫ
and (ii) p(R) is monotonic with p(R) < v2 in R ∈ (v1, R∗).
We check the left and right regions of R∗ respectively:
Left region R ∈ (v1, R∗): for a state in the left region,
there are four possible situations,
a) if p(R) ≤ R,
V (σ) = R∗ −R > 0 (31)
V (f(σ)) − V (σ) = R∗ − h(R, µ)−R∗ +R = 0 (32)
b) if R < p(R) ≤ R∗
V (σ) = R∗ −R > 0 (33)
V (f(σ)) − V (σ) = R∗ − h(R, µ)−R∗ +R < 0 (34)
c) if p(R) > R∗ and h(R, µ) < R∗
V (σ) = p(R)−R > 0 (35)
V (f(σ))−V (σ) = p(h(R, µ))−h(R, µ)−p(R)+R < 0 (36)
d) if p(R) > R∗ and h(R, µ) ≥ R∗
V (σ) = p(R)−R > 0 (37)
V (f(σ)) − V (σ) = h(R, µ)−R∗ − p(R) +R < 0 (38)
Right region R ∈ (R∗, v2):
V (σ) = R−R∗ > 0 (39)
V (f(σ)) − V (σ) = h(R, µ)−R∗ −R+R∗ = 0 (40)
Thus (T ∗, R∗) is a Lyapunov stable equilibrium.
Leveraging Proposition 4, it is clear that lim
k→∞
σk = σ
∗.
Since σ∗ is a stable equilibrium, the adoption is a stable
adoption.
Proof of Theorem 3. For Ramsey two-part tariff, the solution
of (4) has the following expression for volumetric charge (we
give the flat and dynamic expressions respectively)
π†F(R, θ) =
E[λ⊤∂D(1π∗F, ω)/∂π
∗
F]
1⊤E[∂D(1π†F, ω)/∂π
†
F]
(41)
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π†(R, θ) = E[∇πD(π†, ω)]−1E[∇πD(π†, ω)λ] (42)
Expression (41 - 42) reveals that the volumetric rate of Ramsey
two-part tariff only depends on the wholesale market prices
and the demand function, thus stays unchanged with renewable
adoption. The market potential function p(R) thus also has the
same value for different R, that said, is horizontal. The market
potential at the equilibrium is then equal to p(0), the market
potential at R = 0. Utilizing Theorem 2, this equilibrium is
stable.
Proof of Theorem 4. We prove the theorem by showing 1)
such a θ◦ that satisfies p(R♯µL(θ
◦)) = R♯µL(θ
◦) exists 2) for
varying θ, the highest solution of p(R) = R is R◦; 3) R◦ is
approachable by a stable adoption process.
1): It is not hard to observe that as θ increases, R♯µL(θ)
approaches to 0. Since p(R♯µL(θ) is bounded by the number
of total consumers, leveraging Lemma 2, there exists θ¯ such
that ∀θ ≥ 0, R♯µL(θ¯) ≥ p(R♯µL(θ)). By Brouwer’s fixed-point
theorem, there exists θ◦ that satisfies p(R♯µL(θ
◦)) = R♯µL(θ
◦).
2): Suppose there exist R0 > R
◦ and θ0 such that
p(R0, θ0) = R0. According to the second assumption of The-
orem 4, there must exist R♯µL(θ0) ≥ R0 with p(R♯µL(θ0)) ≥
p(R0, θ0). Thus we have R
♯
µL
(θ0) ≥ R0 > R◦ and
p(R♯µL(θ0)) ≥ p(R0, θ0) = R0 > R◦ = p(R◦, θ◦), which
contradict with the first assumption of Theorem 4 and Propo-
sition 1.
3): When increasing θ starting from θ◦, leveraging the
first assumption in Theorem 4 and Proposition 1, p(R♯µL(θ))
increases while R♯µL(θ) decreases. With the second assumption
of Theorem 4, there exists a tariff policy (connection charge
A can be varied) such that ∃ǫ > 0, R < p(R) ≤ R◦ for all
R ∈ (R◦ − ǫ, R◦). By Theorem 2, R◦ is the solar capacity
associated with the stable equilibrium of a stable adoption
under the tariff policy.
Proof of Lemma 2. Denote
rsM(A, θ,R) = max
π
rs(T, θ, R). (43)
θ♯ can be represented by θ♯ = min
R
(rsM(A, θ,R)−MA+ θ).
Let first consider linear tariff, i.e., the connection charge A =
0. We have θ♯ = min
R
(rsM(0, θ, R) + θ). Expanding the min
operation yields
rsM(0, θ, R) + θ ≥ θ♯, ∀R, (44)
which is equivalent to
rsM(0, θ♯, R) ≥ 0, ∀R. (45)
With Definition 1, the critical adoption level R♯ does not exist
for linear tariffs under break-even condition. The nonexistence
of R♯ means there is no death spiral. And since the solar
capacity is nondecreasing and the market potential is bounded,
there must exist a stable adoption. This result can be easily
extended to the two part tariff with fixed connection charge
A♯ = (θ − θ♯)/M by (3).
